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INTRODUCTION

As America's population continues to grow older, the importance
of medical innovation will only increase as new generations of Americans strive to maintain quality of life standards despite inevitable failing health. There is cause for concern, though, that many viable
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medical procedures and devices will remain unavailable to the general
population. Further, inferior health care alternatives might actually
cost the government and private insurance companies more than
state-of-the-art remedies. This Comment addresses several questions
that society faces as the gap widens between medical technology and
its mainstream availability to American medical patients. First, who
sets our national health care priorities? Second, what appellate remedies do Medicare and other insurance beneficiaries have when their
claims are denied? Third, if the beneficiaries themselves do not have
standing to challenge existing policies, is there anyone else who may
have standing to do so? Finally, what might motivate medical technology companies to continue research and development when there is
diminished long-term profit expectation even for successful products?
Before considering the answers to these questions, consider three
snapshots from the American health care landscape that illustrate the
problem at hand:
1) Hallye is a sophomore in college. She is bright, social, and full of
enthusiasm as she begins her independent life. However, she was almost deprived of the chance to enjoy the same kind of independence
and opportunities as her classmates. When she was three years old,
Hallye fell ill with meningitis. By the time she recovered, she had
completely lost her hearing. Luckily, her parents were committed to
finding her the best available treatment, and she underwent a procedure that was largely unproven at the time-the cochlear implantwhich helped her regain her hearing and left her able to communicate
and interact just like the rest of her peers. 1
2) NeuroControl was a well-funded and highly organized company
when it was founded in 1994.2 Its FreeHand system, which offered
independence to tetraplegics through improved functionality of the
hand and fingers, was approved quickly by the FDA in 1997.1 However, clinical trials were conducted at great cost to the company because Medicare and other insurance
providers refused coverage for an
"experimental" treatment.4 FreeHand eventually made it to market
and got approval from insurance carriers, but demand for the device
was lower than projected. Even worse, reimbursement levels were
consistently below 40% of total device and procedure costs.5 Despite
its success with most of the 312 patients who received the device, Free-

1. Telephone interview with Wendy Fulgham, mother of cochlear implant patient
(Mar. 26, 2007).
2. See MicroTransponder, Inc., BUSINESS PLAN 25-27 (on file with Author).
3. See id. at 27.
4. See id. at 26.
5. See Samuel W. Hall, Commercializing Neuroprostheses: The Business of Putting the Brain Back in Business 73-75 (2003) (unpublished thesis, Princeton University), available at http://www.bm.technion.ac.il/niel/index-files/pubs[HallThesis.pdf.
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Hand was off the market by 2001 and NeuroControl withdrew from
the spinal cord injury market.6
3) Mr. Doe is a 78 year-old man who has been admitted to the hospital with a spinal lesion, which prevents him from having proper
bladder control. The doctors tell him that there is a surgical procedure that would correct his bladder control problem. This procedure
costs $40,000, and Mr. Doe assumes that his Medicare benefits will
take care of it. However, the hospital informs him that Medicare does
not cover this procedure; so, if Mr. Doe wants the procedure he must
make the financial arrangements but will not be reimbursed by Medicare. The doctors determine that the next-best treatment option is to
move Mr. Doe into a nursing home, which costs approximately
$70,000 per year, 7 and that the nursing home stay will probably last
two years for a patient like him. If this is true, the total cost is
$140,000, or $100,000 more than the cost of the surgical procedure, for
treatment that was considered second-rate as compared with the surgical option.
Hallye's story is true. Because her hearing loss was the result of her
illness, most of her expenses were covered. 8 But, had she been born
deaf, things would have been different; the cochlear implant that
vastly improved her quality of life would not have been available to
her without financial assistance because it was still considered "experimental" and was not covered by insurance companies at that time. 9
Fifteen years later, however, almost 100,000 people worldwide have
cochlear implants1 ° and most procedures done in the U.S. are subject
to reimbursement by insurance carriers, including Medicare. 1 Hallye's story is one of success. NeuroControl's story is also true. Despite its careful strategy and its successful development of the
FreeHand device, the nature of the health care system in the U.S. led
to its demise.12 This story is one of unfortunate failure. Mr. Doe's
story is hypothetical; although he might not exist, his affliction and its
potential remedy do exist, and patients like him are frustrated by the
6. See id. at 28-29.
7. See Yearly Long Term Care Costs Move Above $70,000 in 2006, According to
Annual Benchmark Study by Genworth Financial, USA, MEDICAL NEWS TODAY,
Mar. 28, 2006, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/40403.php. Medicare will
generally cover only 100 days of skilled nursing care, which amounts to approximately
$19,000 based on a $70,000 annual cost. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a)(2) (2001). So in this
hypothetical, Medicare spends nearly half of the surgery's total cost on less satisfactory short-term nursing care, leaving either the patient or state-funded Medicaid programs to pick up the rest of the bill.
8. Interview with Wendy Fulgham, supra note 1.
9. Id.

10.

NAT'L INST. ON DEAFNESS AND OTHER COMMC'N DISORDERS, COCHLEAR IM-

http://www.nidcd.nih.gov/health/hearing/coch.htm (last visited Sept. 27,
2007).
11. See Medicare & Cochlear Implants, http://www.listen-up.org/ci/med-ci.htm
(last visited Sept. 7, 2007).
PLANTS,

12. See

MICROTRANSPONDER,

supra note 2, at 24-29.
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sometimes illogical results that our health care system produces. His
story is representative of the dilemmas that face many Americans in
his situation whose stories do not yet have endings. What these three
stories have in common is that they collectively represent some of the
interested parties in the highly controversial debate over Medicare's
treatment of new technologies, particularly in the emerging field of
neuroprosthetic devices. As this Comment will demonstrate, the
choices made over the next several years in both the public and private sectors will decide how much access Americans will have to
groundbreaking medical technology.
Despite the myriad medical breakthroughs recent generations have
achieved, there is a significant economic constraint in place that prevents many potentially revolutionary medical devices and procedures
from being used to help improve the condition of patients in the
United States. Because federal Medicare policies prevent the commercialization of many medically viable devices, Medicare patients
are not able to use their benefits effectively and have justifiable claims
that the inefficient system is negating their access to the very benefits
it purports to confer upon them. Additionally, because of the Medicare system's position as the insurance industry's coverage gatekeeper, reimbursement for new technologies is essentially blocked
across the board by a lack of Medicare reimbursement. The paths of
these interested parties-the companies developing new technologies
and the patients hoping to benefit from these technologies-inevitably
cross in navigating the narrow passage to Medicare reimbursement.
Using the field of neuroprosthetics as a paradigm, this Comment
explores the connection between technology manufacturers and patients, as well as the common links between the two groups' facially
differing motivations. Part II offers a basic introduction to the
neuroprosthetic industry and to Medicare's current regulatory environment. Part III frames the reimbursement problem as it exists in
current policy. Part IV explains why Medicare beneficiaries themselves do not have a legally functional remedy, and Part V offers some
potential solutions that may have a better chance of meeting patient,
industry, and legislative goals.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Introduction to Neuroprosthetics

Very broadly defined, neuroprosthetics is a branch of biotechnological medicine that involves implanting devices into the body that
interact with the brain or neural tissue in order to improve or regain a
bodily function.13 The Handbook of Neuroprosthetic Methods defines
neuroprosthetic devices in terms of function and usefulness:
13. See id. at 1.
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol14/iss1/5
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Neuroprosthetic devices are objects that interact with the nervous
system to perform a function that maintains or improves the health
and quality of life of an individual. They can be broken down into
three classes: those that make use of neural measurements as an
input to control a mechanical device that replaces a function of the
body (for example a prosthetic hand that uses myoelectric based
control); those that, based on some action or situation, create an
output signal that is transmitted to a nerve to have a desired action
(for example, neuroprosthetic bladders); and those that have both
neural inputs and neural outputs (for example, devices aimed at

bypassing spinal cord damage).... To be useful (in the eyes of the
user) the device must improve both health and quality of life, it
must be reliable, the performance of the device must be predictable,
the device must be safe and not create other health hazards as a
required in
result of its operation, and the effort and concentration
14
training and day-to-day use must be reasonable.
Neuroprosthetic science was born out of the success of the first artificial cardiac pacemaker; 15 it experienced its first widespread successful application in the cochlear implant;1 6 and it has become a hotbed
of medical research activity in recent years.1 7 Its application-however far-reaching it may be in theory or imagination-has been severely restricted because of an inability to procure adequate
reimbursement from health care providers, beginning, of course, with
Medicare and its prospective payment policies. As discussed below, a
significant economic disincentive lingers for developing medically viable technologies that would vastly improve many patients' quality of
life. The following is a very limited presentation of existing and potential neuroprosthetic applications.
1. Restoring Hearing
The most common and well-known neuroprosthetic devices are auditory prostheses, particularly cochlear implants.18 Originally designed in the early 1970s to aid in lip reading, the cochlear implant has
become a highly effective means of treatment for persons with
profound deafness. 19 Basically, this device translates sounds for its
user (most are designed for interpreting spoken language). Input
sounds are recorded by the device, which reconstructs the sounds and
conveys them by stimulating the receptors on the cochlea inside the
ear of the patient.2" After a patient receives the implant, extensive
14.

HANDBOOK OF NEUROPROSTHETIC METHODS

220 (Warren E. Finn & Peter G.

LoPresti eds., CRC Press 2003).

15.
16.
17.
18.

See MICROTRANSPONDER, supra note 2, at 13.
See Hall, supra note 5, at 31.
See id. at 7-11.
See id. at 27.

19. See

NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, FACT SHEET: COCHLEAR IMPLANTS

1 (Sept.

2006), www.nih.gov/about/researchresultsforthepublic/Cochlearlmplants.pdf.
20. See id.
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therapy and device usage training is required in order to ensure that
hearing is reacquired properly.2 Overall, the auditory prosthesis has
continued to be a true success story for the industry, as many improvements have been made to the design.22
2.

Treating Bladder Dysfunction

Bladder dysfunction can have many neurological causes, most notably spinal cord injury. 23 The REBEC project 24 states that "[o]ver 85
[%] of all patients with traumatic spinal cord lesions suffer from
neurogenic incontinence. This disability is a dismal condition that invariably leads to a poor quality of life."'2 5 Researchers have developed several bladder management systems, which improve bladder
emptying, preserve kidney function, and help to prevent urinary infection through neural stimulation techniques. 26 Many of these systems
have been successfully designed and marketed, most notably the
"Brindley" device, which operates electromagnetically 27 and was
among the first of such devices to be viewed as a clinical success.28
3.

Control of Mechanical Prosthetics

In an application that approaches concepts once reserved for science fiction, evidence suggests that it is possible to use peripheral
nerve control to teach the brain to operate non-corporeal robotic
equipment (equipment that is not attached to the body). 29 One example of such evidence comes from a group of Duke University neurobiologists who report that their experiments with chimpanzees have
produced promising results. 30 For instance, a chimpanzee that researchers implanted with an array of microelectrodes was taught to
use a joystick to position a cursor on a screen in another room. 31 Researchers removed the joystick, and the chimpanzee successfully posi21. See Interview with Wendy Fulgham, supra note 1.
22. See id.
23. See James S. Walter et al., Comparison of Direct Bladder and Sacral Nerve
Stimulation in Spinal Cats, J.REHABILITATION RES. & DEV., Spring 1992, at 13,
13-14.
24. The REBEC project is an effort funded by the European Commission for researching solutions for disabled persons. REBEC Home Page, http://www.rebec-europe.org (follow "Overview" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 7, 2007).
25. Id.
26. See H.E. van der Aa et al., SacralAnterior Root Stimulation for Bladder Control: Clinical Results, 107 ARCHIVES OF PHYSIOLOGY & BIOCHEMISTRY, 248, 249
(1999).
27. See id. at 248-49.
28. See generally id. (presenting clinical results and concluding that the device was
both a short-term and long-term success).
29. See MICRoTRANSPONDER, supra note 2, at 20.
30. See Monkeys Adapt Robot Arm as Their Own, MEDICAL NEWS TODAY, May
11, 2005, http://medicalnewstoday.com/medicalnews.php?newsid=24160.
31. See id.
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tioned the cursor by moving his arm as if he were using a joystick.32
Eventually, the chimpanzee stopped moving his arm altogether and
controlled the cursor using only his brain.33 Not only does this type of
technology seem to have clinical value, but some developers anticipate military applications within this branch of study as well.34
4.

Treatment of Degenerative Disease

Some of the earliest work in the field of neurotechnology involved
deep brain stimulation (DBS), which is accomplished through the implantation of a "brain pacemaker." 35 Essentially, these devices stimulate deep areas of the brain using electric current, which is conducted
through wires that are attached to a battery source. 36 Early application of this technology largely pertained to clinical depression, but
DBS has since been approved to treat Parkinson's Disease and muscular dystrophy. Recent research suggests that similar technology may
be applied to control obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD).3 7
5.

Restoration of Limb Function

Although there have been successful applications, such as FreeHand,3 in restoring the mobility and function of paralyzed limbs, this
is a difficult area in terms of mass commercialization.3 9 The surgery
and recuperation involved with these devices are difficult, and many
patients, despite lacking comparable clinical and pharmacological alternatives, are reluctant to undergo the necessary procedures. 40 As a
result, progress in this area is slowed by the uncertainty surrounding
the demand for the devices.4 1
While necessary to provide context for discussing patients' conditions and potential solutions, this Comment's treatment of
neurotechnology is merely a cursory overview of the field's history,
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See MICROTRANSPONDER, supra note 2, at 20.
35. See BBC News, Brain Pacemaker Lifts Depression (June 27, 2005), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/4625775.stm.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See Section I, supra, for an introduction to NeuroControl's FreeHand device.
The device is essentially a prosthetic hand capable of grasping, which is controlled by
the user's movement of her opposite shoulder. See P. Taylor, et al., Clinical Experience of the NeuroControl Freehand System, available at http://www.salisburyfes.com/
alborg.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2007).
39. See Section I, supra, for a discussion of NeuroControl's difficulties. See also
MICROTRANSPONDER, supra note 2, at 24-29 (presenting case study of NeuroControl's failure in the market).
40. See MICROTRANSPONDER, supra note 2, at 24-29; see also P. Hunter Peckham
et al., Technology Transfer of Neuroprosthetic Devices, 33 J. REHAB. RESEARCH &
DEV. 173, 180 (1996) (describing neuroprosthetic patients' varied attitudes about their
treatment and devices).
41. See MICROTRANSPONDER, supra note 2, at 24-29.
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scope, and progress. As the above synopses demonstrate, neuroprosthetic research and development is an area in which a patient can experience what was once considered impossible.
B.

Introduction to Medicare

Having introduced the concept of neuroprosthetic medicine, the
next appropriate step in analyzing this issue is a review of Medicare's
role in the process of commercializing new technologies. Because of
its status in the American health care industry, Medicare assumes the
position of gatekeeper on virtually all coverage decisions; if Medicare
will not pay for your device, it is highly unlikely that any private insurers will either.4" Not surprisingly, the fact that a government agency
wields such control over an economically lucrative industry fosters extensive debate, including substantial legal commentary. In fact, it has
been noted that more than 500 law review articles discuss Medicare
every year. 43 With that in mind, this Comment's treatment of Medicare is provided strictly for the purpose of establishing a backdrop for
the policy arguments that follow. This brief and general discussion of
Medicare and its current regulations will explain the Medicare gatekeeper phenomenon and provide a context for understanding the reimbursement difficulties discussed in this Comment.
1. Brief Overview
Medicare, Title XVIII of the Social Security Act (officially titled
Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled), is the federal government's health insurance program for the elderly and for persons with
certain disabilities.44 Enrollment in Medicare is automatic for people
who are over the age of 65 and already receive Social Security benefits, and for people entering their 25th month of disability.4 5 Others
with select disabilities may also apply for Medicare coverage.46 The
spouses of traditional Medicare recipients are eligible for the program
as well. 47 The scope of services covered by Medicare Part A includes,
among other things, hospital visits and nursing facilities. 48 Other services, such as prescription medications and ambulance services, are
42. See Hall, supra note 5, at 129-30.
43. David A. Hyman, Medicare Meets Mephistopheles, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1165, 1166 (2003).
44. See BRYAN A. LIANG, HEALTH LAW AND POLICY 93 (2000). Medicaid, insurance for low-income families and individuals, is another form of public insurance created under the Social Security Act. See id. at 105. It is similar to Medicare in many
administrative respects, so many of this Comment's arguments apply to it as well. For
the purposes of brevity and clarity, however, this Comment focuses exclusively on
Medicare because of its size and significance in the health care market.
45. See id. at 93.
46. See id. at 94.
47. See id. at 93.
48. See id. at 94.
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covered by Part B. 49 Part B, however, is partially funded by the beneficiary (usually 20-25%) and is administered by "private entities ... in
the business
of providing or administering health insurance
50
programs.
Although the services listed above are technically covered by Medicare, not every medically-related expense qualifies for reimbursement.
The process of determining which medical services Medicare pays for
comes from the Medicare statute, which is far from instructive. 51 The
statute only lists broad categories of potential benefits and provides
"certain general and categorical limitations" on how much will be
paid. 52 As a result, most of Medicare's coverage decision-making
rules come from the following provision:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no payment may
be made under Part A or Part B for any expenses incurred for items
or services-(1)(A) which ... are not reasonable and necessary for
the diagnosis or treatment of illness or53injury to improve the functioning of a malformed body member.
This "reasonably necessary" limitation has been the source of much
debate in disputes over coverage decisions. 54 It has not been statutorily altered, but policymakers clarify that "reasonably necessary" im'55
plies "safe and effective," "not experimental," and "appropriate.
Finally, appeals of coverage decisions are available only through the
statutorily-mandated administrative hearings.5 6 Attempts at judicial
review have been roundly rejected for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
With such a large base of participants, it is easy to imagine that
Medicare would have a significant market share of the health care
industry in the United States. Beyond just the size of the demographic, its very nature (65 or older and/or disabled) suggests an increased demand for health care services. In fact, the Medicare
population accounts for 69% of total health care spending in the U.S.,
49. See id.

50. See GUIDE TO MEDICARE

COVERAGE DECISION-MAKING AND APPEALS

3 (El-

eanor
51.
52.
53.
54.

D. Kinney ed., ABA Publishing 2002) [hereinafter GUIDE TO MEDICARE].
See id.
See id. at 4.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1862(a) (2001)).
See generally Susan Bertlett Foote, Why Medicare Cannot Promulgate a National Coverage Rule: A Case of Regula Mortis, 27 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 707
(2002) (analyzing the effects of the Medicare program's failure to further define "reasonable and necessary").
55. See GUIDE TO MEDICARE, supra note 50, at 11. The effects of these interpretations will be discussed in greater detail later in this Comment.
56. See Ruqaiijah A. Yearby, A Right to No Meaningful Review Under the Due
Process Clause: The Aftermath of Judicial Deference to the Federal Administrative
Agencies, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 723, 726-27 (2006).
57. See id. A detailed analysis of the jurisdictional issue follows in Section IV
infra.
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as well as 38% of hospital admissions and 48% of inpatient days.5 8 By
occupying such a large piece of the health care pie in this country,
Medicare has accordingly taken on the role of industry standard-setter
in many respects. 59 First, it serves a regulatory function by requiring
Federal Drug Administration (FDA) approval of any medical devices
for which Medicare coverage is sought.6 ° Thus, a private insurer is
wise to follow Medicare's lead; rather than running substantial risks in
procuring treatments for beneficiaries without having first submitted
those treatments to thorough review and approval for safety and efficacy, private insurers can let the Medicare system do the research and
simply echo the agencies' decisions.
Although administrative approval is a necessary first step, commercialization and optimal market realization of the approved devices are
unlikely without sufficient Medicare reimbursement. 6 1 In this way,
Medicare's highly influential decisions on whether to provide reimbursement for new technologies can set trends for third-party insurers,
and at times it can effectively end a device's commercial viability.62
2.

Current Law and Procedures as Applied to Medical Devices

This Comment examines Medicare procedures from the viewpoint
of two interested parties: the manufacturers of medical devices, who
want their devices marketed and used for treatment; and the patients,
who desire better long-term treatment solutions. With that in mind,
this examination of the current regulatory environment focuses on the
procedures and rules in place for potential new medical devices.
a.

FDA's Role

The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 to the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) provide the framework for the approval that devices must receive before they can be marketed. Under
the FDCA, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) must review
new medical devices for safety and efficacy.6 3
i.

Approval

Devices are placed into one of three categories, ranging from Class
I (least medical risk) to Class III (highest medical risk).6 4 Manufac58. Ronald Podraza, Medicare and Reimbursement for Your Product/Service Developed Under SBIR/STTR 2 (July 13, 2006), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/funding
SBIRConf2006/agenda.htm (follow "Medicare and Reimbursement for Your Product/
Service Developed Under SBIR/STTR" hyperlink).
59. See Hyman, supra note 43, at 1166.
60. See GUIDE TO MEDICARE, supra note 50, at 41.
61. See Hall, supra note 5, at 129-30.
62. See id.

63. See

GUIDE TO MEDICARE,

supra note 50, at 41.

64. See id. at 42.
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turers intending to market a new medical device must register with the
FDA at least 90 days in advance in a process known as Premarket
Notification.6 5 This advance notice gives the FDA a chance to "determine whether the device is equivalent to a device already placed into
one of the three classification categories."66 Almost all of the
neuroprosthetic devices contemplated in this Comment are classified
as Class III devices.6 7 One significant aspect of this classification is
that manufacturers of Class III devices must apply for an Investigational Device Exemption (IDE) before beginning clinical trials.6 8
IDEs are comprised of very detailed plans for the clinical investigation process; in 2001 the average time for IDE approval was 28 days,
but a variety of difficulties can make this a burdensome step in the
process for some manufacturers. 69 The clinical trial stage represents
the most uncertain-and often most burdensome-period of FDA
evaluation for most medical devices, and particularly for neuroprostheses because of the lack of established standards for testing and
evaluation.70
After the clinical trials are complete, the manufacturer applies for
pre-market approval, which is designed to be a 180-day process, but
realistically tends to last much longer. 71 The Premarket Approval Application (PMA) generally includes "all known published and unpublished data regarding the safety and efficiency of a device; a full
description of the device; a complete report of manufacturing methods; references to relevant performance standards; sample devices if
feasible; and specimens of proposed labeling. '7 2 An additional cost to
manufacturers is the recently added PMA processing user fee, which
can total up to $154,000. 7 1 A manufacturer can avoid the PMA process if the device being introduced is "substantially equivalent" to a
predicate device on the market. 4 The test for substantial equivalence
is whether the two devices have the same intended use and have either comparable technological characteristics or comparable safety
and efficacy performance. 7 Although this provision can save a device
65. U.S. FooD & DRUG ADMIN., 510(K) OVERVIEW, available at http://
www.fda.gov/cdrh/510k.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2007). This process is also referred
to as PMN or 510(k). Id.
66. Id.
67. See Hall, supra note 5, at 114-15.
68. See id. at 114.
69. See id. at 114-15.
70. See Mark Barnes & Jerald Korn, Medicare Reimbursement for Clinical Trial
Services: UnderstandingMedicare Coverage in Establishinga Clinical Trial Budget, 38
J.

HEALTH

L. 609, 621-24 (2005).

71. See Peckham et. al., supra note 40, at 178.
72. Lee H. Monsein, Primer on Medical Device Regulation Part II: Regulation of
Medical Devices by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 250 RADIOLOGY 10, 16
(1997).
73. See Hall, supra note 5, at 120.
74. See GUIDE TO MEDICARE, supra note 50, at 44.
75. See id. at 45.
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manufacturer some time and money in the PMA stage, there are potentially negative consequences in the reimbursement stage, as will be
discussed below. Generally, neuroprosthetic devices are ineligible for
substantial equivalence status because they are truly new devices.76

ii. Humanitarian Device Exemptions
Congress created an exception in 1990 to shelter certain devices
from aspects of the premarket review process. The Humanitarian Device Exemption (HDE) for humanitarian-use devices (HUDs), which
are "targeted at a disease or condition that afflicts fewer than 4,000
Americans annually," allows a PMA without an efficacy data requirement.7 7 Approval of an HDE grants the manufacturer the right to
market the device for 18 months in the U.S., with subsequent 18month renewals allowed as long as required." The catch is that
HDEs have a fixed price ceiling that cannot exceed the total costs of
research, development, fabrication, and distribution. 79 Although the
objective of the HDE policy is to support research in underdeveloped
areas,8" the price ceiling restriction can constrain a good deal of the
desired research and development enthusiasm. 8 The FDA Modernization Act of 1997 offers another exception under which most
neuroprosthetic devices qualify. This one is a priority review process
for devices that "provide for more effective treatment or diagnosis of
life-threatening or irreversibly debilitating human diseases or conditions."82 As the policy analysis below asserts, these exceptions are a
good start towards reform but do not address the major problems in
commercialization, which are clinical trial costs and approval for
reimbursement.
b.

CMS's Role: Coverage Decisions and Coding for Reimbursement

The decision as to whether a new device will be covered rests with
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).8 3 There are
two types of coverage decisions: Local Coverage Decisions (LCDs)
and National Coverage Decisions (NCDs). 4 LCDs are the most common and are typically made by regional contract providers. 85 These
discretionary decisions generally involve non-controversial technolo76. See Hall, supra note 5, at 120.
77. See Max Sherman et al., HumanitarianUse Devices, 57 FooD &

DRUG

L.J. 95,

97 (2002).
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See id. at 97-98.
See id. at 98.
See id. at 95.
See Hall, supra note 5, at 121-22.
21 U.S.C. 360e(d)(5) (2007).

83. See

GUIDE TO MEDICARE,

supra note 50, at 20.

84. See Podraza, supra note 58, at 12-13.
85. See id.
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gies and are made before any national decisions have been made. 86
NCDs are usually issued when local contractors develop different policies concerning a particular device; when a device is particularly expensive or controversial; or when there are concerns about program
integrity.87
88
New medical devices are likely to end up in the NCD category. If
the NCD process is not initiated by CMS to reconcile different local
decisions, the process will be initiated by a "formal request for a national coverage decision," which is usually made by the device manufacturer, but may be made by a beneficiary, physician, or other
person. 89 CMS imposes a 90-day timeline for making its decisions,
subject to a number of circumstances that might result in an extension.9 0 One of the criticisms of this review process is that there is substantial overlap in the facts reviewed during the FDA's initial
approval process and CMS's review for coverage decisions. 91 However, the agencies conduct their respective reviews with different
objectives: whereas the FDA reviews for safety, efficacy, and validation of manufacturers' claims, the CMS review considers the device's
relative necessity, marginal benefit to the program as a whole, and
general cost-effectiveness. 92 As mentioned earlier, CMS's coverage
decisions may only be appealed through the administrative process
provided by the statute.9 3
If CMS approves a new device for coverage, it is assigned to a Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) 94 to determine the amount of reimbursement under the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS). 95 The
PPS was established as part of Congressional cost-cutting measures in
1983 based on a theory that similar illnesses would necessitate similar
treatments which, in turn, would have similar costs associated with
them. 96 As a result, almost 500 DRGs were created; 97 when a patient
is placed into a DRG category, reimbursements are determined by the
DRG's assigned payment weight and not by any of the individual
treatment option variables. 98 Despite their differences, treatments for
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See Hall, supra note 5, at 134-35.
89. See GUIDE TO MEDICARE, supra note 50, at 22.
90. See id. at 20.
91. See id. at 41.
92. See Podraza, supra note 58, at 20.
93. See Yearby, supra note 56.
94. DRGs are patient classification groups. See Payments to Providers-Diagnosis-Related Group Prospective Payment Reimbursements, 5 Fed. Admin. Prac. (West
4th ed.) § 6338, WEST-FDADM § 6338 (Current through 2007 Update).
95. See Hall, supra note 5, at 129.
96. See id. at 130-31.
97. See id.
98. See Maria Fontanazza, New CMS Reimbursement Policy Rushed, Says Industry, MED. DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY, http://www.devicelink.com/mddi/
archive/06/07/016.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2007).
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similar diagnoses are grouped together in a DRG, mutually exclusive
of the other DRGs.99 The effect on new technology after the creation
of the PPS was stifling."° Essentially, any new device must fall into
an existing DRG code. If it does not, it is unlikely to receive reimbursement. 1 1 Even if it does receive some reimbursement, those reimbursement levels might be inadequate to support the development
costs. Lobbying for modification of the DRG codes, in order to adequately fund new technologies, has been a difficult battle. 102
In 2001, CMS initiated some progress toward more expeditious coding modification.1" 3 Under this process, additional payments may be
made for new technologies that meet three criteria:
1) total charges per case must be significantly in excess of average
per case charges within the relevant DRG; 2) the technology must
represent a "substantial improvement in caring for Medicare beneficiaries," and 3) the technology must be new, with no existing cost
data on which to base reimbursement decisions. 104
However, the additional expenditure is limited: the additional payment cannot be more than 50% of the excess cost, and the excess cost
cannot be more than 50% of the total per case cost of the technology. 10 5 The most restrictive limit is that the new technology program
payments cannot exceed 1% of the total annual PPS expenditure. 0 6
So, while this new policy certainly represents a step forward toward
rewarding new technology development, it is a very cautious step.
III.

ANALYSIS

OF CURRENT POLICY TOWARD NEW DEVICES

Having framed the problem of how patients' needs remain unmet in
the strict regulatory environment for medical devices, this Comment
proceeds to a brief analysis of the faulty thinking that has influenced
current Medicare policies. Specifically, this section argues that this
system's inherent problems are aggravated by skewed or illogical valusuch as device effectiveness and determination of
ations of variables
10 7
necessity.
99. See Hall, supra note 5, at 130-31.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 141-42.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. Noted scholar of legal economic theory Richard A. Posner notes that "[w]hen
cost-benefit analysis is applied to the regulation of risks to health and safety by different federal regulatory agencies, bizarre anomalies that no one would defend ... are
discovered." Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification,and
Comment on Conference Papers,29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1157 (2000).
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A.

Reactionary Legislation

In his commentary on the scientific implications of commercializing
neuroprosthetics, Samuel Hall suggests that inefficiencies in decisionmaking are partially to blame for an over-regulated Medicare reimbursement scheme.10 Decision-making inefficiencies are certainly
not unique to the health care industry; often the routine decisions
made by managers and administrators in any field are criticized for
similar decision-making errors. 10 9 Commonly, managers and administrators are averse to taking action if it might mean making noticeable
mistakes for which results can be quantified. In decision-making theory these are considered Type I errors (or false negatives).110 These
happen because in most situations where taking a risk might have a
big potential payoff, the decision maker is also exposed to scrutiny
over the results if the payoff falls short of expectations. In business,
an example of a Type I error is hiring a volatile but successful executive who ends up embarrassing the company and, in turn, embarrasses
the decision-making executive or board of directors. In sports, when a
football coach decides to try a field goal on fourth down instead of
going for the first down, this is an aversion to Type I error: if he elects
to try for the first down and the team does not succeed, the fans and
media might ridicule the coach for his poor decision-making. In
health regulation terms, a Type I error is incorrectly deciding to approve a device and then that device ends up harming someone.1 1'
Type II errors (or false positives), 1 2 on the other hand, are generally considered benign from a second-guess standpoint because there
is no tangible data on which to base criticism. If a decision maker
simply chooses not to act, the risk of failure is eliminated and the unknown nature of any potential positive results presents less opportunity for criticism. Although economists who place value on
opportunity costs might chastise those guilty of too many Type II errors, in many circles there will be a less sufficient basis for scrutiny by
choosing not to act. Thus, most of these decisions are insulated from
criticism. Returning to the previous examples, the board of directors
that nervously passes on an executive who could have made the company millions of dollars is guilty of Type II error. The football coach
who always loses by three points because he always elects to kick field
goals appears to be playing conservatively or "by the book," but he
really just might be consistently making Type II errors. And the
108. See Hall, supra note 5, at 111-14.
109. See, e.g., Martin Landau & Russell Stout, Jr., To Manage is Not to Control: Or
the Folly of Type II Errors,39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 148, 148 (1979) (addressing managers' tendencies toward making Type II errors).
110. Eric W. Weisstein, Type I Error, Mathworld-A Wolfram Web Resource,
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/TypeIError.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2007).

111. See Hall, supra note 5, at 111-14.
112. Eric W. Weisstein, Type II Error, Mathworld-A Wolfram Web Resource,
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/TypeIIError.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2007).
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health administrator who declines to reimburse a new medical procedure is insulated from criticism, but we may never know how many
lives the procedure could have improved if not for his potential Type
II error.
It is this aversion to Type I error, and more significantly the public
criticism that accompanies it, that has characterized U.S. health regulations during the last century. Most major health regulations were
made as reactions to public outcries over tragedies that resulted from
bad decisions or ineffective products. 1 3 For example, the original
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was passed in 1938 on the heels of
outcry about the unregulated state of food and cosmetics, particularly
the deaths of more than 100 people who took an unregulated therapeutic

drug.11 4

Also,

amendments

tightening

control

over

pharmaceuticals passed in 1962 after fallout from the negative effects
of morning-sickness pills.115 While one cannot blame public servants
for taking action to prevent tragic circumstances from recurring, the
context for evaluating the success or failure of a modern medical
treatment has been skewed by a demand for perfection.
Consider this hypothetical example: researchers design an implantable device that is designed to preserve life for ten years in people
who would ordinarily die after two years without treatment. One
thousand people are implanted with the device. What if four people
died within a year from side effects of the procedure? Is this device a
failure because it shortened the life expectancy of four while it more
than doubled the life expectancy of hundreds of others? 1 6 This example is not to suggest that a utilitarian approach is necessarily correct
and that the loss of four lives is a desirable outcome. It is merely to
illustrate that quantitatively the device in this scenario is effective in
the context of its application and alternatives. But, realistically, this
device manufacturer might be subject to sanctions and civil liability
and the thousands whose7 lives had been extended would likely be disappointed by its recall."
From this standpoint, one can address the issue of inadequate reimbursement or inconsistent coverage decisions for new devices as an
application of purely avoiding Type I error. There is surely economic
motivation as well; how much money does a Type I error perhaps
cost? Perhaps millions of dollars? On the other hand, Type II errors
113. See Amer S. Ahmed, The Last Twist of the Knife: Encouraging the Regulation
of Innovative Surgical Procedures, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1529, 1531-36 (2005).
114. See id. at 1532-33.
115. See id. at 1533-34.
116. The ethical and economic problems surrounding subjective and objective valuation of human life is a complex discussion that accompanies the questions raised
here. See Posner, supra note 107, at 1163-65 (suggesting that people never subjectively reduce the value of their lives and noting that saving an older person from one
disease might be merely opening the door to her contracting another one).
117. See id. at 1153.
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are essentially free passes. The argument here is a simple one that
must appeal to public policy makers: in the context of caring for our
Medicare population, when making coverage decisions one must consider the non-quantifiable effects of a potential Type II error (such as
the possible benefits and quality of life that has been denied) and not
just the quantifiable value of a potential Type I error (economic savings, public opinion, and maintaining the status quo).
B.

Misplaced Blame

Much discussion is made about the public costs of Medicare, and
the foremost factor behind virtually all current Medicare policy is the
constraint of costs.1 18 Perhaps this is appropriate; most Americans
probably believe that government spending should be curtailed where
possible and that a full-scale national health care system is either undesirable or should at least be managed appropriately. 119 However,
when the politicians demand reform and attack the bulging size of
Medicare, the economic inefficiencies in the system are seldom
blamed. Instead, common scapegoats are fraud and abuse. 2
Fraud and abuse do present relevant problems for the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA), which now considers "claims for
services that are not medically necessary" to be the second largest
cause of improper payments.1 2 ' While the government has gotten
tough on providers who bill Medicare for false claims of medical necessity, 2 2 the main source of the problem remains unaccounted for:
the agencies give no guidance whatsoever as to what the term "medical necessity" actually means. 12 3 The result is that providers attempting to follow Medicare's rules are faced with the prospect of liability
or punishment in the event that an administrative law judge later disagrees with them as to their good faith assessment of a treatment's
necessity. 124 Indeed, the current environment appears "designed to
encourage Medicare contractors to assume that providers have engaged in wrongful behavior, rather than to assure the proper exercise
25
of discretion and judgment by the contractors.'
Naturally, for many providers, the default proposition becomes denial of coverage if there is any trace of doubt about a coverage deci118. See Timothy P. Blanchard, Medicare Medical Necessity Determinations Revisited: Abuse of Discretionand Abuse of Process in the War Against Medicare Fraudand
Abuse, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 91, 93 (1999).
119. The Author assumes that Congress has been speaking for the people it represents in choosing not to introduce a universal health care policy.
120. See generally Blanchard, supra note 118 (discussing the Medicare system's policies against fraud and abuse).
121. See id. at 117.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 120-21.
124. See id. at 119.
125. See id. at 129.
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sion. 126 This type of environment stifles research and development of
new technologies because there is little hope of ever achieving adequate reimbursement levels. For device manufacturers it is a vicious
circle: they cannot get local coverage because Medicare has not covered them nationally and because local contractors are afraid of false
charges of improper payments. Conversely, Medicare will not cover
them because the local contractors have not been doing so. And without a favorable national coverage decision from Medicare, there is little hope of ever being covered adequately by private or third-party
insurers. In the center of this dilemma is the Medicare beneficiary,
who gets less access to new technology with every turn of the circle.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF BENEFICIARIES' RIGHTS AND AVAILABILITY
OF REMEDY

This Comment presents a number of grievances that Medicare beneficiaries might have with the program and its policies, the most basic
of which is that the policies in place prevent beneficiaries from effectively using the very benefits that the program is designed to confer
upon them. Unfortunately, as this section will reveal, beneficiaries'
remedies are extremely limited, and it may ultimately be up to the
medical device industry itself to ensure, through pursuit of mutual interests, that the American public has access to the medically viable
technologies that fly under the radar of Medicare reimbursement.
A.

Foreclosure of Judicial Review

The Administrative Procedure Act sets up an elaborate system of
judicial review for parties who wish to dispute claims and decisions
under the Medicare Act.127 As a principle of administrative law, "judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not
be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was
the purpose of Congress. '128 Regarding reviewability under the Social Security Act (under which Medicare falls), the Supreme Court has
ruled that
[T]wo types of action by the Administration are subject to this presumption of reviewability. First, determinations made by the Administration pursuant to its regulations and the statutes that it
administers are presumptively reviewable. Second, denials of
claims, where such denials are based on statutes alleged by the
be unconstitutional, are also presumptively
claimant to
129
reviewable.

126. See id. at 133.
127. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
128. Id.
129. Tamara Lesh, Judicial Review: The Preclusive Effect of the JurisdictionalProvisions of the Medicare Act, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 999, 1003 (1988).
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So, there are theoretically two avenues by which a beneficiary can
challenge coverage decisions: individual challenges of determinations
and challenges to constitutionality.
The Medicare Act, however, contains jurisdictional provisions that
severely limit a claimant's access to these "permissible" areas of review. 13 0 Particularly, section 405(h) effectively prohibits judicial review of claims:
The findings and decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the Commissioner of Social Security shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal,
or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action
against the United States, the Commissioner of Social Security, or
any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331
or 1346 of Title
131 28 . . . to recover on any claim arising under this
subchapter.
The Supreme Court confirmed this provision's scope in Heckler v.
Ringer.1 32 There, Ringer, a Medicare recipient, sought a judgment to
receive money for an operation that he needed and that was historically covered by Medicare, but had recently been excluded from reimbursement.1 33 Even though his claim was technically a question of
the ruling's constitutionality, the Court held that section 405(h) applied to his claim because "he was still seeking reimbursement of the
award of benefits under the Medicare Act. Thus, his claims arose
under the Medicare Act" and were barred. 3 4 Ringer was stuck because his constitutional claim could not be heard until the agency's
decision became final.13 5 But the agency refused to give a final decision until he actually underwent the operation and requested reimbursement. 1 36 Because Ringer could not afford the operation on his
own, he was not only kept out of court, but also precluded from using
his Medicare benefits.' 37 Essentially, this ruling illustrates that the
only remedy available to an aggrieved Medicare recipient would be a
claim challenging a coverage decision on constitutional grounds, but
only if all administrative appeals options had been exhausted and only
after actually receiving an uncovered treatment and paying for it out
of pocket.

130. See id. at 999-1000.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (2001).
Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984).
See id. at 609-12.
See Yearby, supra note 56, at 755.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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Availability of ConstitutionalClaims

Based on the Court's decision in Ringer, it seems that only pure
constitutional claims, and perhaps not even all of those, may exist
against the government for its failure to provide Medicare beneficiaries with adequate access to its benefits. The basic claim asserted
here is that beneficiaries are generally denied access to specific treatments that may be in line with Medicare's overall policies of cost effectiveness and safety, but the PPS and other reimbursement
procedures dictate what amounts to a taking or withholding of benefits. Because the nature of this claim is that of an improper taking, the
Due Process Clause is probably the most relevant basis for a constitutional attack on the Medicare reimbursement policy.
The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause states that no person
will "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . .

"138

The Supreme Court has "ruled that welfare recipients'

right to statutorily granted payments constituted property" and that
"[t]he deprivation of this property right required the government to
provide procedural due process rights."' 39 This is the basis for requiring procedural administrative review. It has already been established
that this process does not provide an adequate remedy. Thus, the only
way that Due Process doctrine may be applied is if a case could be
made that the government's interest in its Medicare PPS constitutes
an undue burden on the beneficiaries' property rights. 140 To arrive at
that conclusion, however, the right affected must be a fundamental
right. 141 This claim ultimately fails, then, because it is settled that
"[t]he entitlement to the receipt of Medicare reimbursement
is not a
'4
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution."'
C. Availability of Manufacturer Claims

Because it appears unlikely that Medicare beneficiaries can make a
valid constitutional claim that challenges the reimbursement policies,
it might be left up to the medical device industry to assert a claim.
Even though the Medicare laws exist solely for the well-being of its
beneficiaries, it is theoretically possible under the "zone of interests"
138. U.S.

CONST. amend. V.
139. Yearby, supra note 56, at 737.
140. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)
(articulating the undue burden doctrine that applies in due process cases).
141. See id. at 964 (explaining fundamental right doctrine in due process analysis).
142. Hosp. San Rafael, Inc. v. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. 927, 939 (D. P.R. 1991); see
also Am. Soc'y of Cataract & Refractive Surgery v. Bowen, 725 F. Supp. 606, 613
(D.D.C. 1989) (ruling in D.C. District Court that the challenged coverage ruling did
not restrict the patient's access to care in a way that "shocks the conscience" );
B.G.M. Enters. v. Harris, 482 F. Supp. 1073, 1082 (D. Mont. 1980) (ruling in Montana
District Court that nursing facility's rights under the Social Security Act are not in the
same class of fundamental rights as the rights to procreate and to raise a family).
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a claim
doctrine for a device manufacturer to have standing to bring
143
challenging the constitutionality of the Medicare policy.
The test for prudential standing is "whether a would-be challenger
to agency action is pursuing an interest 'arguably within the zone of
interests' Congress intended either to regulate or to protect. 1 44 Here,
the beneficiaries' interests are the ones protected. "Also included
within that zone, however, are parties whose interests, while not in
any specific or obvious sense among those Congress intended to protect, coincide with the protected interests. 1 45 Here, the manufacturer
of a non-reimbursed medical device could satisfy this requirement.
Unfortunately for the beneficiaries, this challenge would also most
likely fail. In TAP Pharmaceuticalsv. U.S. Department of Health &
Human Services,146 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
drug manufacturer's challenge to a Medicare ruling failed for lack of
standing because the manufacturer's interest did not coincide with
"the statute's interest in making the best of medicine more available
to Medicare recipients."' 4 7 In that case, the manufacturer contested a
ruling determining that its drug would be reimbursed at a lesser rate
than a competitor's drug. 48 While the plaintiff manufacturer argued
that its drug was superior and thus in alignment with "making the best
of medicine more available to Medicare recipients,"1'4 9 the court found
that 1) there was no specific allegation that its drug was better than
the competitor's; and 2) because the plaintiff's drug was reimbursed at
all, it was thus50"made more available," which was consistent with the
stated policy.'
So, at least in the D.C. and Fourth Circuits, the device manufacturer's claim would likely fail unless it were able to specifically allege
its superiority to alternative treatment and that its level of reimbursement was insufficient to make it "more available" as consistent with
the stated policy. This burden seems steep, but in the event that the
right set of facts presented itself, the device manufacturer would theoretically have the requisite standing to bring a claim.
V.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

It should be evident from this Comment that with so many competing interests and factors at work around this issue there is no clear-cut
solution to the new technology reimbursement problem. Making the
143. See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Thomas, 885 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. TAP Pharms. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 163 F.3d 199, 205 (4th
Cir. 1998).
147. See id.
148. See id. at 201-02.
149. See id. at 205.
150. See id. at 204-05.
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best possible medical technology available to the American public will
require concerted efforts from public policy makers and private industry alike. The following suggestions are not the answers to these
problems, but rather they are starting points. They are drawn from
varied sources, and they offer a few ways that both the public and
private sectors can align the interests of the parties involved in order
to make commercialization of neuroprosthetic devices more feasible.
A.

Preemptive Treatment as a Cost-Effective Solution

The basis of the policy favoring preemptive treatment is the basic
economic argument that a long-term investment will pay itself off.
Many neuroprosthetic device applications eliminate the need for prolonged care or otherwise treat a condition in such a way as to mitigate
the need for constant care. In these cases, there is substantial economic justification for reimbursing the expense fully in order to save
money in the long-run. Consider the following hypothetical: there is a
procedure and subsequent treatment plan designed to restore functionality to a person's paralyzed limbs. At a [hypothetical] cost of
$95,000, assume that this treatment would result in the person's ability
to be self-sufficient and forego the necessity of living in a managed
care or assisted living facility. If paying for the stay at the facility costs
$32,000 per year,15 ' the break-even point for the investment would
arrive at the end of the third year of treatment at the facility. So,
economically, there are cost savings in every year beyond that point
for this patient. This is a simple hypothetical example, but there is
already
precedent of this type of thinking in other areas of health care
1 52
law.

For instance, Congress revised the Medicaid system along these
lines in 1989 by giving children covered by the program "access to
preventive health care-such as vision, hearing, and dental servicesthat preempt the onset of childhood illness and identify children with
disabilities in need of early attention."'1 53 Another example of this
principle is the Texas Medicaid provision that requires all residents of

151. See Yearly Long Term Care Costs Move Above $70,000 in 2006 According to
Annual Benchmark Study by Genworth Financial USA, supra note 7.
152. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 107 (offering potential definitions of "cost-benefit
analysis" and commenting on the positions of several presenters from an Economic
Law conference). It is true that the additional costs in this hypothetical may be borne
by a variety of parties, including Medicare, Medicaid, or the patient. In any event, the
up-front treatment seems to be a more efficient allocation of resources that will likely
end up coming from a government-funded program.
153. See Barak D. Richman, Behavioral Economics and Health Policy: Understanding Medicaid's Failure, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 705, 765 (2005).
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nursing homes to receive annual dental exams as15a4 means of preempting the costs associated with future treatments.
While funding for the types of medical devices and procedures discussed in this Comment would certainly be a significant extension of
these Medicare/Medicaid-related applications, there is still a foundation for it in existing public health care policy. One can reasonably
presume that as similar programs experience success and begin to appear on more lawmakers' radars, the support for such programs is
likely to gain momentum.
B.

Reevaluation of the Current Patent System

Another possible solution is reevaluation of the current patent system's policies toward competition and motivation. William M. Sage
addresses this topic in his article on medical innovation, in which he
argues that there is a critical inefficiency in our current patent system
that inhibits private industry from making necessary investments in
technology.1 5 5 He argues that technical advances-particularly those
developed with public funding-"should be cost-effective" and "available equitably to potential users," and that our current system does
not promote either of these criteria.1 56 Sage proposes a modification
in which there is more centralized initial analysis of technologies and
their anticipated cost-effectiveness, which he suggests would promote
public sharing of information and competition in research while still
1 57
offering protection to those who achieve certain pre-defined goals.
Although Sage and the reformers make valid observations about
the shortcomings of the current patent system, it is unclear how the
heavier regulation that this type of adjustment would require might
alleviate any inefficiency. Rather, this type of centralization might operate to slow down the innovation process and act as a further disincentive to research and development. Regardless of which side of the
patent reform debate ultimately prevails, analysis of relevant patent
law will be central to the fate of the small-to-medium-sized device
manufacturer.
C. Adjustment of Criteriafor Coverage Decision-Making
The problem of unclear coverage based on "reasonable necessity" is
particularly upsetting because both lawmakers and Medicare beneficiaries seem to voice a preference for some settled guidance, even if it
154. See
SENATE

TEX. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. COMM'N, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF
BILL 34-FINAL REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 2 (Dec. 2002), http://

www.hhsc.state.tx.us/medicaid/reports/122002_sb34DentalCare.pdf.
155. See William M. Sage, Funding Fairness:Public Investment, ProprietaryRights
and Access to Health Care Technology, 82 VA. L. REV. 1737, 1737 (1996).
156. See id. at 1740-41.
157. See id. This type of proposal is representative of the ongoing debate over patent reform.
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were possibly unfavorable toward their specific interests in some applications.15 8 Professor Susan Bartlett Foote suggests that attempts to
promulgate a national coverage rule for Medicare have reached regula
mortis, or a state of inaction caused by a stalemate between the relevant stakeholders. 159 In this scenario, the stakeholders are the CMS
policy makers in charge of constraining costs, the Medicare beneficiaries, and the device manufacturers trying to secure appropriate reimbursement levels. Because the competing stakeholders share the
desire for clear procedural rules but their respective approaches appear incompatible at this point, Foote suggests a "Common Law for
Criteria."16 Under this system, individual coverage decisions would
be made by an advisory board (rather than the strict DRG coding
standards) and a body of "coverage decision common law" would accumulate, much like case law.161 This process would begin to make
decisions more predictable, as providers and beneficiaries would have
some body of decisions to reference for precedential value. 1 62 This
may be untenable logistically, but it is a novel solution for a stalemate
such as this one.
Along the same lines, CMS might consider approaching a modification of the DRG coding system as it now operates. Within the existing
DRGs, each individual treatment could be defined, along with all associated costs and benefits, and assigned a numeric value. By using a
pre-screening process (when available), a beneficiary who requires
treatment will apply for the treatment through a physician or provider. The DRG database of treatments could evaluate the costs and
benefits of each available treatment plan against the particular demographic details associated with the beneficiary. The DRG database
could then align a proper treatment with the individual beneficiary.
For example, a 75 year-old patient might be better suited for a less
invasive, sustained (and perhaps less expensive) treatment, while a 65
year-old with the same ailment might qualify for a more expensive,
long-term cost-effective treatment. Again, this type of database
would require an extensive logistical undertaking, but it would
achieve the dual goals of: 1) providing clear, predictable criteria; and
2) removing the subjective regulatory element from the decision-making process.
However, CMS has recently taken steps in the opposite direction by
announcing the first changes to the PPS in almost 20 years. 1 63 Among
the changes being made is a shift from DRGs based on weighted
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See
See
See
See
See
See

Section 11 (B), supra.
Foote, supra note 54, at 721.
id. at 726.
id.
id.
Fontanazza, supra note 98.
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charges to DRGs based on weighted costs. 1 64 Because some of the
data being used is more than five years outdated, the difference in the
assigned costs and the actual current costs could mean even less reimbursement potential for new devices. If a device has become more
cost-effective or uses newer (and potentially cheaper) technology, it
will still be judged against similar devices that have not achieved these
small manufacadvances. This counterintuitive result further deters
165
turers from developing state-of-the-art devices.
D. Expansion of New Technology Exceptions
The new technology exceptions that allow for increased reimbursements are a significant step toward providing incentive for new research and development. However, the caps on excess costs, and
more significantly, the total cap on spending through the program (at
1% of total annual benefit payments) cut into the incentive. 6 6 An
extension of this program to levels of 4-5% of the total spending
would create many more opportunities for qualifying devices to find
the marketplace. More importantly, the additional opportunity creates an environment more conducive to success for the manufacturers,
which could have a reciprocal positive effect on the policy. With a few
victories in funding new technology exceptions that are capable of establishing efficacy and creating long-term cost savings, CMS might be
more likely to approve reimbursement for procedures that might once
have been rejected. This simple expansion of existing exceptions
might not address all of the big issues, but it is the most straight-forward solution and poses the fewest logistical barriers to
implementation.
E.

A Reimbursement-Focused Business Model

While patients are forced to rely on others to initiate policy changes
on their behalf, device manufacturers have more control over their
own destinies and can proactively address their problems, even in the
face of legislative non-responsiveness. The manufacturers of new
medical devices must be proactive in their dealings with Medicare in
order to avoid some of the pitfalls that ruined early attempts at marketing neuroprosthetics. Ronald Podraza, CEO of Reimbursement
Principles, Inc., emphasizes that a focus on reimbursement, beginning
in the earliest stages of planning and lasting throughout the development process, is essential to securing reimbursement levels adequate
for effective commercialization. 67 Perhaps the most critical stage in
164. Id.
165. See id.
166. See Section II, supra (discussing evolution of Medicare policies and new device
exceptions).
167. See Podraza, supra note 58, at 23-25.
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which reimbursement plays a role is the clinical trial stage.' 6 8 While
manufacturers have to be diligent in complying with Medicare rules
that prohibit reimbursement for certain types of clinical activity, a failure to seek reimbursement and establish accurate costs and reimbursement records during the clinical trials will almost certainly leave
reimbursement levels well below expectations once the device is marketed.' 6 9 Podraza estimates that up to 94% of all IDE devices are
eligible for reimbursement during clinical trials,' 70 so getting started
early on securing accurate reimbursement levels should help prevent
major underpayment down the road. 7 '
V.

CONCLUSION

Common sense and basic economic theory tell us that if there are
good products being made, people are going to use them and will be
willing to pay for them. This Comment demonstrates that this is not
always the case. Currently, our health care system is producing
counterintuitive results because of political pressures, flawed determinations of value, impenetrable bureaucracy, and unsuccessful business
approaches. As our country's population gets older and health careassociated costs continue to increase, there will only be more separation between those who can afford the best health care alternatives
and those who must settle for second-class treatment.
Clearly, the beneficiaries of this nation's largest medical services
provider are experiencing an increasing lack of access to many viable
new technologies. The solution, it appears, can come only through a
unique alignment of interests among several parties that are traditionally viewed as being exclusively self-interested. While the Medicare
population is currently without a workable remedy to address the policies that deny them access to the highest level of medical care, there
is ample room for legislative action and forward-thinking technology
manufacturers to improve system-wide access. Through their efforts
and open-mindedness, Medicare beneficiaries might finally be able to
truly receive their benefits on a more regular basis.
Jack Price
168. See id. at 19.
169. See generally Barnes, supra note 70 (discussing the process of designing clinical
trials pursuant to Medicare guidelines).
170. See Podraza, supra note 58, at 18.
171. See generally Peckham et. al., supra note 40, at 176, 180 (discussing transfer of
technology in development and marketing process and offering several strategies for
improving the development of new medical systems).
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